After Lisbon: National Parliaments in the European Union

The role of national parliaments in EU matters has become an important subject in the debate over the democratic legitimacy of European Union decision-making. Strengthening parliamentary scrutiny and participation rights at both the domestic and the European level is often seen as an effective measure to address the perceived ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU – the reason for affording them a prominent place in the newly introduced ‘Provisions on Democratic Principles’ of the Union (in particular Article 12 TEU). Whether this aim can be met, however, depends crucially on the degree and the manner in which national parliaments actually make use of their institutional rights. This volume therefore aims at providing a comprehensive overview of the activities of national parliaments in the post-Lisbon era. This includes the ‘classic’ scrutiny of EU legislation, but also parliamentary involvement in EU foreign policy, the use of new parliamentary participation rights of the Lisbon Treaty (Early Warning System), their role regarding the EU’s response to the eurozone crisis and the, so far under-researched, role of parliamentary administrators in scrutiny processes. This introduction provides the guiding theoretical framework for the contributions. Based on neo-institutionalist approaches, it discusses institutional capacities and political motivation as the two key explanatory factors in the analysis of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs.     

The distribution of individual cabinet positions in coalition governments: A sequential approach

Multiparty government in parliamentary democracies entails bargaining over the payoffs of government participation, in particular the allocation of cabinet positions. While most of the literature deals with the numerical distribution of cabinet seats among government parties, this article explores the distribution of individual portfolios. It argues that coalition negotiations are sequential choice processes that begin with the allocation of those portfolios most important to the bargaining parties. This induces conditionality in the bargaining process as choices of individual cabinet positions are not independent of each other. Linking this sequential logic with party preferences for individual cabinet positions, the authors of the article study the allocation of individual portfolios for 146 coalition governments in Western and Central Eastern Europe. The results suggest that a sequential logic in the bargaining process results in better predictions than assuming mutual independence in the distribution of individual portfolios.     

"The World Changed Today": Agenda-Setting and Policy Change in the Wake of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks

The September 11 terrorist attacks constitute a focusing event that have been said to have “changed everything” in America. However, the literature on focusing events, policy change, and the policy process suggests that the “windows of opportunity” opened by focusing events like the September 11 attacks do not automatically equate to policy change. This paper considers whether and to what extent the agenda and policies have changed as a result of the attacks. While the events of September 11 provided the impetus for change, the threat of terrorism was already well established in the policy stream, and September 11 only threw open the window of opportunity for policy change based, in large part, on preexisting ideas; many of these ideas were enacted. And in the case of aviation security, some innovation is evident in the area of cockpit security.     

A Pragmatic Response to an Unexpected Constraint: Problem Representation in a Complex Humanitarian Emergency

This paper elaborates a model of problem representation first presented by Billings and Hermann (1998) . The foreign policy process begins when decision-makers specify policy goals and identify relevant constraints in response to a perceived problem. Although this initial problem representation often sets the course for subsequent policy, unanticipated constraints can arise that catch decision makers off-guard. Finding themselves in a context they did not anticipate to be in, decision makers may choose to alter their representation of the problem and/or change the course of policy. Billings and Hermann offer one piece of this puzzle by examining how decision makers re-represent problems; this paper provides the second piece by assessing how policies, not representations, change in response to new constraints. A case study of the U.S. response to the Ethiopian famine in the mid 1980s demonstrates that policy does not always follow problem representation.     

Attachment and social bonding in maximum and minimum security prison inmates

Attitudes towards social attachment and bonding were evaluated in groups of maximum (N=48) and bonding were evaluated in groups of maximum (N=46) security prison inmates and compared with the attitudes of a group of 49 noncriminal college students. Three primary styles of attachment were considered: avoidant, ambivalent/anxious, and secure. It was predicted that the maximum security condition, a group hypothesized to contain a large number of lifestyle criminals, would evidence more of an avoidant style of attachment compared to minimum security inmates or a group of college student controls. Consistent with this hypothesis, the maximum security inmates exhibited greater avoidance in their attitudes towards relationships than subjects in the other two conditions. The implications of these results are discussed.